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Abstract The claim that the observation of a violation of a Bell inequality leads to
an alleged alternative between nonlocality and non-realism is annoying because of
the vagueness of the second term.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the violation of Bell’s inequality has often been interpreted as either
a failure of locality or of realism (or of both). The problem with such a claim is that
it is not clear what realism in this context should mean. In this note my goal is to
look for a definition of realism compatible with the claim that it has been falsified.1
Sometimes realism is defined as the hypothesis that every physical quantity always
has a value.2 But then, either this value is unaccessible, hence unphysical, or this
value can be revealed by appropriate measurements (to arbitrary good approximation,
at least in principle). Hence, these measurements have predetermined outcomes and
realism is nothing but a fancy word for determinism. If so, first, why should one use
the word local realism instead of local determinism? And second, Bell’s inequality
1My personal definition of realism—that clearly has not been falsified—is another issue. For me realism
means [2], very briefly, that physical systems possess properties preexisting and independent of whether we
measure the system or not; however these preexisting properties do not determine measurement outcomes,
but only their propensities. Accordingly, there are realistic random events that reflect preexisting properties,
as required by realism, simply the reflection is not deterministic.
2For example, in [1] A. Zeilinger at al. define realism as “the assumption that measurement outcomes are
well defined prior to and independent of the measurements”.
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can be stated and proven without any assumption about determinism. Consequently,
determinism is not the issue and a meaningful definition of realism has to be found
elsewhere.
In order to analyse what realism could mean in the context of Bell inequalities,
let us start from the basic assumption underlying them. For simplicity we restrict
ourselves to two parties, named as usual today, Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob have
a choice between a number of possible measurement settings; each measurement
leading to one result among a set of possible results. Actually, since Bell’s inequalities
are not limited to physics, but can be applied to any kind of multiparty correlations,
we prefer to use a slightly more general framework. Hence, let’s denote x and y Alice
and Bob’s inputs (the physicist’s measurement settings), respectively, and denote a
and b their respective outcomes (the measurement results). A correlation is then the
conditional probability distribution p(a, b|x, y) that Alice and Bob’s outcomes are a
and b, given that their inputs are x and y, respectively.
So far, so good. However, the situation summarized by the correlation p(a, b|x, y)
may actually arise out of a statistical mixture of different situations traditionally la-
belled by λ1 for the first possible situation, λ2 for the second one, and so on. These
λ’s may include the usual quantum state ; they may also include all the information
about the past of both Alice and Bob. Actually, the λ’s may even include the state of
the entire universe, except for the two inputs: x and y should be independent of λ,
i.e. p(x) = p(x|λ) and p(y) = p(y|λ). But λ may as well be much more restricted:3
the only constraint on λ is that it should not contain any information about the choice
of the inputs x and y.
Without loss of generality, each conditional correlation can be expanded:
p(a, b|x, y,λ) = p(a|x, y,λ) · p(b|x, y, a,λ). The locality assumption is then that,
for any given “state of affair” λ, what happens on Alice side does not depend
on what happens on Bob’s side, and vice-versa: p(a|x, y,λ) = p(a|x,λ) and
p(b|x, y, a,λ) = p(b|y,λ). Consequently, the general assumption underlying all
Bell’s inequalities reads:
p(a, b|x, y) =
∫
dλ ρ(λ) p(a|x,λ) · p(b|y,λ) (1)
where ρ(λ) ≥ 0 is the (possibly unknown) probability distribution of the parameter λ.
Technically, the additional variable lambda is assumed to belong to a set equipped
with a measure such that the integral in (1) is well defined [3]. Another technical
reminder is that whenever the set of possible inputs and outcomes are finite, then
the set of correlations {p(a, b|x, y)} satisfying (1) is convex with a finite number of
vertices. Each facet of this set corresponds to a Bell inequality. Hence, a correlation
p(a, b|x, y) violates a Bell inequality if and only if it can’t be decomposed as in (1).
Again, the interpretation of (1) is as follows: The local probabilities of outcome a
on Alice’s side and outcome b on Bob’s side depends only on the local inputs, x and
y on Alice and Bob’s sides, respectively, and on the state of affairs, denoted λ. Hence,
3Don’t think of λ as an old fashion local hidden variable. Think of λ as the physical state of the systems
as described by any possible future theory. Hence, studying Bell’s inequality tells us something about any
possible future theory compatible with today’s experimental observations.
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given the variable lambda, the probabilities of outcome a on Alice side, for input x,
pA(a|x,λ), and similarly on Bob’s side, pB(b|y,λ), are independent. Accordingly,
condition (1) is clearly about conditional independence. The motivation for this in-
dependence assumption is that since Alice and Bob are spatially separated, all they
could do (consciously or oblivious to them) is to exploit some previously established
common strategy (described by λ). This is the locality assumption. But is there also
a realism assumption hidden in (1)?
Note that condition (1) can be formulated within the formalism of standard quan-
tum physics, though we know it is not satisfied by quantum physics:
p(a, b|x, y) = Tr(Xa ⊗ Yb ρ) =
∫
dλ ρ(λ) Tr(XaλA) · T r(YbλB) (2)
where Xa and Yb are the eigenprojectors of the observables X and Y with eigenvalues
a and b, respectively. The set of all λ’s is the set of all pairs of quantum states,
λ = (λA,λB), where the first element of the pair is a valid quantum state λA of Alice’s
quantum system and the second element a valid quantum state λB of Bob’s system.
This clearly shows that, besides the locality assumption, condition (1) doesn’t contain
any further assumption incompatible with quantum physics.
Many physicists, not familiar with Bell inequalities, get scared when one talks
about nonlocality and may thus prefer to write “incompatible with local realism”,
hoping to avoid nonlocality.4 From my experience, this is due to a confusion between
the kind of nonlocality encountered in quantum physics and the locality condition
familiar in relativity [4]. The fact is that nonlocality does not imply the possibility of
signalling, i.e. some nonlocal correlations, for instance those predicted by quantum
physics, can’t be used to communicate from Alice to Bob, nor from Bob to Alice.
Hence no signalling and nonlocality are different concepts, the former is essential for
relativity, the later is a well confirmed prediction of quantum physics.
2 Analysis of Possible Hiding Places for Realism
Could it be that the abundant usage of the terminology “local realism” is merely a
collective bleating of a vacuous phraseology, that is a kind of soft option? or is there
something more to it?
Let us look at Fig. 1 that summarizes the situation and let’s first concentrate on
Alice’s side (Bob’s side is completely analogous). We see 3 parts: the input (on the
top), the outcome (on the bottom) and in-between a black box with blurred bound-
aries. The details of this black box are unimportant for our discussion, it suffices that
4This is even more surprising when one realizes that classical physics has been much more severely non-
local than quantum physics until the advent of general relativity [4]; indeed, Newton’s law of universal
gravitation predicts the possibility of instantaneous signaling across the entire universe by merely moving
some masses that, according to Newton’s theory, would immediately modify the gravitational field every-
where. Hence, physics provided us with a nonlocal description of Nature during all of its history, except a
mere decade, approximately between 1915 and 1925! Note however, that Newton never claimed his theory
to be complete [5]; it is only his followers that, like e.g. Laplace, elevated Newton’s deterministic equations
to some sort of religious belief of ultimate truth.
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Fig. 1 For each run of the
experiment, Alice and Bob each
input one value of x and of y
into their black boxes; the latter
then return one and only one
outcome a and b to Alice and
Bob, respectively. Note that in
order to test condition (1) the
experiment has to be repeated
many times until the statistics
allows one to infer a good
approximation of the probability
p(a, b|x, y)
it does not extend to Bob’s side, i.e. that the two parties can be clearly and unam-
biguously distinguished. This distinguishability condition can easily be satisfied by a
suitably large distance separating Alice and Bob. Let us emphasize that the content
of the black box could be anything. It could contain, for instance a bunch of smart
physicists equipped with powerful computers or with some quantum particle shelved
in some quantum memories, or anything else, classical, quantum or described by
some future theory not yet discovered. In particular we don’t need to make any real-
istic assumption about the content of the black box. For example, claiming that the
content of the black box is not real doesn’t change the situation: the question whether
the correlation p(a, b|x, y) can be decomposed as in (1) remains unaffected by such
a claim.
Hence, let’s have a closer look at the two other parts of Alice, her input x and
outcome a. Here we find a possible hint of what realism could mean. Indeed, it is
vital for the sake of the argument that both x and a are classical data, i.e. data that
can be copied, stored, broadcast, compared and processed by humans. Clearly, if the
input x can not be processed by Alice, in particular if Alice can’t decide which input
she wants to apply for each run of the experiment, or if Alice can’t understand the
outcome a as one and only one outcome for each run, then we can’t make sense of
the entire argument depicted in Fig. 1.
It seems we have found one—and only one—place where realism plays a role: the
inputs and outcomes have to be real, i.e. the players Alice and Bob should have direct
access to their inputs and outcomes. More precisely, they should have the freedom
to choose the inputs (or the freedom to choose the device to which they wish to
delegate this choice, typically a random number generator of their choice); and they
should be able to read the outcomes (in their mind, or, again, to a freely chosen
alternative memory device). Note that nothing in the argument is said about the way
the outcomes are produced, deterministic or not, under partial influence by the player
or totally independent of her/his decisions/actions/wishes.
So, what could non-realism mean? Logically, either that the inputs are not real,
or the outcomes (or both). The first alternative would mean that Alice can’t freely
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decide which input to use for each given run of the experiment. Well, this is a log-
ical possibility. But is it an interesting one? I believe no, because if humans are not
assumed to have the possibility to decide which experiment to perform, and when to
perform them, then there is no way to test any scientific theory: this would be the end
of Science. Hence, assuming non-realism of the inputs would amount to a sort of sui-
cide of Science. Let’s thus concentrate on the assumption that the outcomes are not
really real. What could this mean? Well, here we encounter the infamous quantum
measurement problem: possibly measurements don’t have one result but lead to a su-
perposition state of the universe corresponding to all possible measurement results.
Here I see two ways of developing this argument. First, the usual many-world view.
Let me merely state that I consider this view as uninteresting (though logically con-
sistent, like solipsism, another logically consistent though uninteresting view): taken
fully seriously, the many world view leaves no space for freedom; indeed, it implies
full determinism.5
There is, however, a second side to the assumption that the outcomes are not really
real: indeed, one could speculate that it takes some time before the black box outputs
some definite outcome. If this time is longer than usually assumed, then there could
be enough time for a sub-luminal hidden communication between Alice and Bob [6].
This raises the following question: when is a quantum measurement finished? Is it
as soon as a detector fires, as implicitly assumed by almost all experimentalists? Or
should one wait until a human becomes conscious of the result (and here John Bell
would ask whether this human should hold a PhD?!?). The general idea that it may
take some significant but finite time for a quantum measurement to output a (classical)
result is interesting, especially if models can be experimentally tested, see e.g. [7].
3 Conclusion
In conclusion, the claim that the observation of a violation of a Bell inequality leads
to an alleged alternative between nonlocality and non-realism is annoying because of
the vagueness of the second term [8–10]. The only place where non-realism could
make some sense in the context of Bell inequalities is actually the old quantum mea-
surement problem. This is indeed an interesting problem and I am confident that some
day physics will have very interesting things to say about it. However, it is not specific
to Bell inequalities. Moreover, it is unclear in which sense it could solve the locality
problem [11, 12]. Indeed, as long as one can distinguish Alice from Bob, the locality
conundrum remains. Hence, all violations of Bell’s inequality should be interpreted
as a demonstration of nonlocality. Moreover, once nonlocality is accepted new find-
ings become possible, like, e.g. the security of quantum key distribution against any
(individual) attack by eavesdroppers only limited by no-signaling [13, 14].
5One may think that this is similar to classical physics; however there is a huge difference. In classical
physics things are logically separated, hence there is room for a hypothetical mind-body interface (some-
thing like Descartes’ pineal gland) through which humans (and animals) can freely act upon the material
world. Because of entanglement, this escape is impossible in quantum physics. I believe the many world
view is incompatible with freedom, hence uninteresting to me. Moreover, I don’t see any explanatory
power: it merely elevates the linearity of the Schrodinger equation again to some sort of religious belief of
ultimate truth.
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Let me finish on a personal note. For me, quantum nonlocality is an established
fact. Yet, it remains mysterious: how does Nature organize its book-keeping to know
which measurements should produce nonlocal correlations [15]? Is Nature using an
enormously—monstrously—vast Hilbert space to keep track of which physical sys-
tems (particles or modes) are entangled? For me this question, like the quantum mea-
surement question, is a real physics question: some day Science will have something
meaningful to say about both of these questions. We will then realize that these two
questions are essentially different and that the answers open entirely new fields of
research for physics.
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